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Commentaries to the German Federal Constitutional Court’s unprecedented
judgment  in Weiss (2 BvR 859/15 and others of 5 May 2020) are likely to focus on
the German court’s argument on proportionality (see e.g. the very helpful comment
by Tony Marzal). As is well known by now, the German court criticised the Court of
Justice and refused to follow its judgment in Case C-493/17 Weiss of 11 December
2018, for failing to apply the German version of proportionality and for not fully
‘balancing’ economic arguments. In European Union law, however, this kind of
review does not normally take place. In cases of a challenge to the legal basis of
an EU competence and where no individual rights or fundamental freedoms are
involved, the CJEU normally limits its review to something closer to an English-style
‘rationality’ review, which looks at manifestly inappropriate objectives and measures.
Remarkably, the German Court was fully aware of this fact: it cited thirty sixdifferent
judgments of the CJEU  at par. 126. They make clear the differences between the
German and EU conceptions of proportionality.. Nevertheless, rather than accept
that proportionality applies in a different way in Luxembourg, the German Court
demanded that the CJEU – and by extension all other jurisdictions of the EU – adopt
the Germansense as the only ‘methodologically’ acceptable (par. 156).
This would be enough to reject this judgment as illegitimate and wrong. It is not open
to the German court or any other national court to impose its own administrative
law to the other members. This is why we have created the Court of Justice of the
European Union, to reach a common view on matters of EU law. The very idea that
a state of the EU would seek to impose its own rules on all others in defiance of its
treaty obligations, is simply repugnant to the rule of law and contrary to what the
member states have agreed. So when the German judges required the ECB, which
was not (and could not be) a defendant in this case, to re-issue its Decision on PSPP
‘within three months’, and called the CJEU’s judgment ‘not comprehensible’ (at par.
116) and ‘objectively arbitrary’ (par. 118) and treated it as if it were non-existent, they
committed an unprecedented act of legal vandalism.
My focus here, however, is not on this aspect of the case, but on something that
makes the case even more alarming. What were the constitutional principles that
made such a judgment possible? Most European jurisdictions recognize the primacy
of EU law in the following sense: They say that the European Court of Justice has
the exclusive task of interpreting EU law, so that the Court of Justice must have the
last word on matters relating to the EU Treaties. States accept the primacy of EU
law through an understanding of the required division of labour among courts and
through a principle of ‘institutional tolerance’ (I explain this in detail in my recent book
on the legal nature of the EU, Eleftheriadis, A Union Peoples, OUP, 2020, ch. 4).
Until recently this was the case in Germany under the Honeywell judgment of
2010, which reserved an ‘ultra vires’ review only on what we could loosely call
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‘constitutional essentials’. It seems that this judgment is no more. In Weiss the
German Constitutional Court says that even the smallest or a merely procedural
failure of the CJEU to effectively monitor the EU’s competences can be ‘structurally
signficant’ form a ‘constitutional’ point of view. Why is this so? I will try to explain
this here as briefly as I can, although I accept that this important question requires a
fuller treatment.
My answer is that the German Court has taken a surprising and ultimately illegitimate
turn towards a narrow and inward interpretation of its constitution, which inexplicably
neglects its European dimension. The Court has restated its own principles, on the
basis of a set of surprising and ultimately indefensible doctrines. This is not just a
domestic debate. Given the potential effects of Germany’s apparent defiance of
EU law and in light of the current ongoing discussions about the desired increased
burden-sharing among the winners and losers of the Eurozone (something on which
I have written here and here), the internal constitutional argument in Germany is a
matter of great significance for the future of the Eurozone.
Three Strange Principles
The German Court’s judgment depends on three intricate principles that the
Court says are implicit in the German constitution, to such an extent that they
are ‘unamendable’ under the ‘eternity’ clause of Article 79. These are unique to
Germany and unfamiliar in other European jurisdictions. These are (i) the principle of
‘constitutional identity’, (ii) the principle of the ‘right to vote as a part of sovereignty’
and (iii) the principle of ‘budgetary sovereignty or autonomy’.
These principles originate in some doctrines developed by the Court over the last
thirty years, starting with the Maastricht judgment and especially through the Lisbon
judgment of 2009, but as I will show they have acquired an entirely new  meaning
since the Eurozone crisis. In their newest manifestation in Weiss, these principles
are the cause of the confrontation with EU law. It is important to note that these
doctrines are not derived from the main ideas that we find in constitutionalism’s
liberal and democratic canon. This canon, as we see it in the US, Canada, Britain,
France, Belgium, Netherlands, Greece and other parliamentary democracies, allows
for the harmonious cooperation of sovereign states for the purpose of ‘managing
their interdependence’ (to borrow a key term used by Stephen Weatherill in his Law
and Values in the EU, OUP, 2016).
The new German principles are hostile to managing interdependence. They adopt
a strangely inward account of constitutional law that departs form constitutional
interpretation as we see it in other democracies. As I will show below (and
as I argued in more detail here, when the first such arguments emerged), the
German principles originate instead in Carl Schmitt’s dark musings about ‘popular
sovereignty’ (on which see Lars Vinx’ illuminating analysis here). They tie the
German Constitution to an ideal of the collective self-expression of the German
people that sees anyexternal legal obligation as a threat. #hese Schmittian principles
confuse the sharing of power with the loss of sovereignty and to that extent
contradict the European dimension of the German Basic Law.
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The Doctrine of constitutional ‘Identity’
The first such principle is the principle of the protection of the ‘constitutional identity’
of Germany as an independent state. It is set out in Weiss as a matter linked to the
‘eternity’ clause of the German constitution::
‘The democratic legitimation by the people of public authority exercised in Germany
belongs to the essential contents of the principle of the sovereignty of the people and
thus forms part of the Basic Law’s constitutional identity protected in Art. 79(3) GG; it
is therefore beyond the reach of European integration in accordance with Art. 23(1)
third sentence in conjunction with Art. 79(3) GG’ (par. 101)    
That a constitution limits how much power may be delegated to an international
body is, in principle, a very good point. Imagine if the European Union successfully
claimed plenary legislative power. It would follow that Germany’s political institutions
would have lost their power to decide political matters for themselves. German
political structures would thus be a deception. There would be a legislature without
legislation. So there are limits to international cooperation: no transfer of power could
lawfully turn our parliament into a joke.
This argument, however, applies only to important constitutional transformations,
not to any error supposedly committed by an international body to which we
have delegated powers. Without tolerating such errors, no delegation is possible
anywhere Indeed, in Honeywell (2 BvR 2661.06 of 06.07.2010) the German
Constitutional Court explained that under the Maastricht and Lisbon judgments
the German Courts would exercise an ultra vires review only in cases ‘of manifest
transgressions of competence’ or ‘on the basis of the exercise of competence
in the area of constitutional identity’ (par 55). It reserved therefore the ultra vires
review for manifest failures and for what we might call violations of constitutional
fundamentals. 
This point is put in a much simpler way by other jurisdictions. They say that
accession to the EU, even when it takes place through a constitutional amendment,
is not supposed to undermine the pre-existing general architecture of the
constitution. This is an entirely uncontroversial point, which arises just from the
systematic nature of constitutional law. One does not need any deep theory about
the state’s ‘identity’ to make it. In this way the United Kingdom Supreme Court, for
example, ruled in its HS2 judgment in 2014 that the European Communities Act
1972 as a ‘constitutional statute’ enjoyed a certain primacy over other acts, but had
not abolished all other ‘constitutional instruments’ of the British Constitution, which
remain valid and equally overriding.
          The German Court has transformed this obvious principle of coherence into
an entirely different idea of the inherent value of the self-expressionof the German
people. So, the court says that‘the democratic legitimation by the people of public
authority… belongs to the essential contents of the principle of the sovereignty of the
people’ (par. 101). This is not an innocence exaggeration, because the constitution
is hereby transformed into something other than the totality of the procedures and
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principles included in the text and in the practices of officials and courts, which
naturally includes its transnational and European dimensions. The subject matter
of ‘constitutional identity’ is not a set of rules but only the unidentified object of
a supposed German ‘people’supposedly in control of ‘popular sovereignty’. The
constitutional transfer of sovereign powers to the EU by virtue of Article 23 of the
Basic Law becomes an insignificant footnote. It follows that even the smallest
transgression of EU competences will deprive the German people from its inherent
powers and is a threat to ‘constitutional identity’. 
The Doctrine of the Right to Vote
The second strange doctrine of the German constitutional court is the right to vote,
as it relates to the shape of the German Republic. Again, in principle the right to
vote is a good and simple principle of constitutional law. But in the hands of the
German Constitutional Court in Weiss, it acquires an almost mystical content
connecting it to the inherent power of the people. This doctrine means that any
possible contravention of the division of powers between the EU and the member
states is also an immediate violation of the individual right to vote of all German
citizens under Article 38 of the German Constitution. This is so even though the
competence at issue may have nothing to do with voting or a free and fair election.  
The argument has an important procedural dimension, which we should not lose
sight of. Citizens have standing before the German Constitutional Court only if
they claim that one of their ‘basic rights’ has been violated. Since the Eurosceptic
politicians that have brought the Gauweiler and Weiss challenges cannot show any
other loss or violation that they have suffered by the challenged omissions of the
German Government, Article 38 and the right to vote is the only procedural avenue
they can use to gain access to the court. Unless this argument succeeds, these
cases would have been thrown out as inadmissible.
How is the right to vote connected to the precise allocation of competences? The
Court states that the right to vote requires that citizens be subject to such public
authority ‘as they can legitimate and influence’ (par. 99). The Court explains that the
right to vote is not merely a liberty or power to choose from available options in free
and fair elections (which is what the right to vote means in other European states)
but the entirely different right to effectively influence the outcome of the political
process. So the Court states that the right to vote protects individuals against ‘a
manifest and structurally significant exceeding of competences by institutions,
bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union’ (par.98). If the EU usurps
powers from the state, it leaves fewer powers for the voters to share. It follows that
any transgression by the EU of its competences takes away a small but significant
amount of power from each voter. In other words, each voter in the Court’s view
has a piece of ‘sovereign power’ to influence the Bundestag, so that any curtailment
of the powers of the Bundestag is at the same time a reduction in the amount of
sovereignty possessed of each voter at the moment of election.
This is an obviously false doctrine. No voter has a piece of sovereignty, which
is to be used in an election. Our votes are never guaranteed any influence at
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all. The value of voting does not derive form the amount of influence it secures.
Voters in the German Eurosceptic party AfD, for example (a former leader of which
was among the claimants in Weiss), have no influence over the current German
government. This is because they are not that many of them. The party received
just 12% in the 2017 German election. They are a minority and therefore remain
in opposition. So the party’s voters have today zero influence over government,
not 12% influence. Yet, no rights of theirs are violated. This is how parliamentary
democracy is supposed to work. The Constitutional Court is thus entirely wrong
about the value of voting and its supposed immediate reduction by the transgression
of EU competences.  
The German Constitutional Court’s argument in effect assumes that under Article 38
all voters are entitled to influence government. This seems to be the meaning they
give to the idea of voting as holding ‘sovereign power’ (para. 103). Yet, voters do
not have such a right. Voters elect representatives and the representatives of the
majority in parliament set up a government. But only the majority rules. The minority
stays in opposition. It seems to me that in the eyes of the German Constitutional
Court this must be an unconstitutional violation of the right to vote, for those who
voted for the opposition are excluded from exercising their ‘share of power’ and are
thus deprived of their share of ‘popular sovereignty’. It is an absurd idea. To lose
influence is not to lose your right to vote.
The Court’s interpretation of the right to vote is paradoxical for another reason.
The Court states that the principle entails that citizens can only be ‘subjected to
such public authority as they can legitimate and influence’, so that ‘any act of public
authority exercised in Germany can be traced back to its citizens’ (para. 99). So
the principle ‘prohibits subjecting citizens to a political authority they cannot escape
and in regard of which they cannot in principle influence, on free and equal terms,
decisions on the persons in power and on substantive issues’ (par. 99). This would
mean that all courts in Germany are unconstitutional. Judicial power (including the
power of the German Constitutional Court, by the way) must be ‘illegitimate’ and
contrary to popular sovereignty, since it cannot be ‘influenced’ by the electorate ‘on
free and equal terms’. There is evident confusion here between politicallegitimacy
and democraticlegitimacy. Political legitimacy rests on elections. Democratic
legitimacy rests on other forms of accountability as well. This erroneous argument
about democracy is at the heart of the Court’s resistance to the EU.
The Principle of Budgetary Sovereignty
This takes us to the third idiosyncratic doctrine of the Constitutional Court. It is the
doctrine of ‘budgetary sovereignty’ or ‘budgetary autonomy’, which is intimately
connected to the Article 38 argument. The Court believes that the German
Parliament must have complete controlover all ‘financial matters’ that concern the
state. It cannot share decision making powers with foreigners and it cannot share
risks with them. This doctrine is stated in Weiss as follows:
‘Art. 38(1) first sentence, Art. 20(1) and (2) and Art. 79(3) GG protect, in particular,
the budgetary powers of the German Bundestag … and its overall budgetary
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responsibility as indispensable elements of the constitutional principle of democracy
… It is for the German Bundestag, as the organ directly accountable to the people,
to take all essential decisions on revenue and expenditure; this prerogative forms
part of the core of Art. 20(1) and (2) GG, which is beyond the reach of constitutional
amendment’ (par. 104).
This is in my view the strangest of the doctrines of the German Constitutional Court,
for it directly contradicts the very idea of the European Union.
          As is well known the European Union’s main principle is that states should
share economic decision-making with one another. They do so either through the
Treaties, and the freedoms established there, or through secondary law. This is
the basis of the single market. For example, the free movement of goods, services,
persons and capital exposes all member states to economic uncertainties that are
caused by the free and uncontrolled movement of goods, persons and capital.
Nobody really knows how many migrant workers may turn up on any given years, or
how many of your businesses are going to go bankrupt because of effective foreign
competition. The Union is based on these shared risks and the associated transfers
of wealth from one country to another. But this is how it should be. The EU member
states joined willingly, having considered that the benefits of openness in the single
market – economic, political and ethical –  outweighed the costs. This is even
more clearly so in the case of the EMU, where the members of the Eurozone have
decided to give up something extremely valuable to them, namely their monetary
and exchange rate policies. All states are now exposed to the decisions of the ECB
which they cannot fully control, although they are being represented in its Governing
Council. They have made a democratic decision to share economic and fiscal
powers on the basis of shared laws. This the whole point of the European Union.
          How then did Germany join the EMU?Is not the very idea of monetary union
a violation of ‘budgetary sovereignty’? The answer is that this doctrine did not exist
at the time Germany joined. It is an entirely new doctrine, which was created in
response to the Eurozone crisis, when the possibility arose that Germany might
have to assist states that were burdened by the Eurozone’s flawed initial design.
This doctrine was not there at all at Maastricht. The Weiss judgment cites only the
Lisbon judgment as the original statement of the principle, but the principle there
was something entirely different. In Lisbon (BVerfGE 123, at par. 256) the Court
stated that not every European obligation that has an effect on the budget endangers
the viability of the Bundestag as an effective legislature. The Court said that the
Bundestag needs only ‘overall responsibility’:
‘The openness to legal and social order and to European integration which the Basic
Law calls for, include an adaptation to parameters laid down and commitments
made, which the legislature responsible for approving the budget must include in
its own planning as factors which it cannot itself directly influence. What is decisive,
however, is that the overall responsibility, with sufficient political discretion regarding
revenue and expenditure, can still rest with the German Bundestag’ (Lisbon
judgment, par. 256, emphasis added)
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That was in 2009, at a time of openness.Today the Court takes the directly opposite
view. It says, in effect, that all essential fiscal decisions must be controlled by the
Bundestag, even if the Treaties have committed Germany to a monetary union with
other states. This is by far the most baffling doctrine of the German Constitutional
Court, because it is against the very idea of being a member of the Eurozone. How
do you control the budget if you have no control over the currency in which it is
written? If this principle means anything at all, it must surely entail that Germany’s
participation in the Eurozone is unconstitutional. The Court does not say that,
however. Instead, it uses this principle selectively as a big stick with which to hit the
politicians. It is an infinitely open-ended principle that permits the Court to interfere
with public policy at will. This is no constitutional principle..
The Principles at Work
How were these principles applied in Weiss? Summarised briefly, the three
principles were applied in the following ways.
First, the principle of ‘constitutional identity’ is not technically being violated by the
bond buying programme (par. 116, and par 227). However, the idea of constitutional
identity enters into the idea of the review of EU’s actions, through another ground the
Court considers, which it calls ‘scope of European integration’. Here constitutional
identity is mentioned as one dimension of the required assessment by the Court (at
par. 101). So the alleged failures of the Court of Justice are presented as legally
unacceptable in Germany because they ‘manifestly exceed the judicial mandate
conferred upon the CJEU …  and result in a structurally significant shift in the order
of competences to the detriment of the Member States’ (par. 154, see also 157,
158). The same failure is evident in the ECB whose decision constituties a  ‘violation
of the principle of proportionality’ which is ‘structurally significant so that the actions
of the ECB constitute an ultra vires act’ (par. 166) and also violate the principle of
proportionality (par. 167). The test of ‘structurally significant’ failures of EU law can
only be understood, I believe, against the background of the theory of constitutional
identity, because they only structure that matters in this argument must be the
presumed ‘deeper structure’ of the constitution, which is to be understood through
‘popular sovereignty’.
Second, the Court found that the ‘right to vote’ was also violated because the failures
of the ECB and the CJEU resulted in a ‘structurally significant shift in the order of
competences to the detriment of the Member States’ (par. 157) and because any
violation of the division of competences is immediately a violation of the right to vote
(see for example par. 116, 143, and 154-158).
It appears that the third principle, ‘budgetary autonomy’ was not directly violated.
The bond buying programme did not provide for ‘risk sharing’ among member
states and thus did not affect the ‘budgetary responsibility of the Bundestag’ (par.
227). The principle plays a major role in the judgment, though, through another
route, namely its role in the required proportionality review. The main reason why
the proportionality review of the CJEU was inadequate from the German point of
view was that it did not consider the potential ‘losses’ of the PSPP bond buying
- 7 -
programme. One of the losses was precisely to the ‘budgetary autonomy’ of the
states, as the Court explains:
‘In that regard the CJEU does not make it clear which opposing interests these
two safeguards serve; objectively it can be assumed that they serve the budgetary
autonomy of Member States and thus promote fiscal policy interests, which do not
fall within the ambit of monetary policy, as follows from Art. 126 TFEU. However,
it appears that other opposing interests are not taken into consideration’ (par. 132,
emphasis added).
In this respect, the idea of ‘budgetary autonomy’ is at the heart of the case, for
the failure of the CJEU to meet the proportionality test was based precisely on the
construct of ‘losses’ to that ‘budgetary autonomy’ is idea.
This is so even though the court has arrived, by a long and tortuous argument, to the
conclusions that the ECB (and the CJEU) did not, after all, violate Article 123 TFEU
so that ‘it follows from an overall balancing that a manifest violation of Art. 123(1)
TFEU is not ascertainable’ (para. 180). But having just said that, the court says ten
paragraphs below that because of the failure of ‘proportionality’ the CJEU ‘allows the
ESCB to conduct economic policy’ (par 133).
So the case turns on the application of these three unfamiliar principles. It is equally
important to stress, however, that these are relatively new principles. They were not
part of the standard analysis of EU law by the German Constitutional Court in the
Maastricht and Libson judgments. Under the old principles, the applicants’ claims
in Weiss would have been found either inadmissible or unfounded. The judgment
in Weiss is based on the precisely opposite theory to that endorsed by the court
in Honeywell. The new view is that any violation of the allocation of competences,
however small and procedural and even if it is not manifest and it does not concern
constitutional essentials, may be ‘structurally significant’. This is because, as we
have seen, the Court has stretched the idea of ‘constitutional identity’ beyond
recognition, inflated the idea of a ‘right to vote’ to the idea of shares in sovereignty
and created the  novel and absurd construct of national ‘budgetary autonomy’.
These idiosyncratic principles, that are unknown in all other major European
constitutions, are now seen, to be part of the ‘unamendable core’ of the German
constitution and are held to be – at least implicitly –more important than Article 23
which creates an obligation to respect EU law. As the Court put it at par. 158: 
[The principle of conferral] is integral to justifying the decrease in the level of
democratic legitimation of the public authority exercised by the European Union; in
Germany, this decrease in democratic legitimation not only affects objective tenets
of the Constitution (Art. 20(1) and (2) GG) but also bears upon the citizens’ right to
vote and their right to democracy (Art. 38(1) first sentence GG). For safeguarding
the principle of democracy, it is thus imperative that the bases for the division of
competences in the European Union be respected (par. 158).
- 8 -
This paragraph summarizes the new doctrines of the German Constitutional Court
and its novel conclusion that even the simplest mistake by the EU on the allocation
of competences is a serious violation of the German constitution.
It is important to add that the weakness and the novelty of the majority’s doctrines
were highlighted in the dissenting opinions of Justices Lübbe-Wolff and Gerhardt
in the earlier 2014 OMT judgment. Unfortunately, their views did not persuade
the current majority and neither Lübbe-Wolff nor Gerhardt continue to sit at the
court, having reached the end of their respective terms. More recently three judges
dissented from the equally Eurosceptic judgment of the German Court in the Unified
Patent Court Case in February 2020. Sadly, only one judge voted against the
majority in Weiss, where the votes were 7 to 1. However, the sole dissenting voice
did not find the time or the courage to compose a separate opinion. But judges
should not hide in such circumstances.
Conclusion
If I am right this is not a singular judgment. It has its origins in some truly
idiosyncratic doctrines about democracy pursued by the Court (as I also observed
a few years ago when these doctrines first emerged). Weiss may be the prelude to
further rejections of Germany’s duties to the European Union by the German Court
because of a new inwardness based on these theories. It would thus be wrong for
the other member states to believe that the problem will soon go away. It will not go
away as long as the German court maintains its peculiar inwardness and as long as
it remains outside the European constitutional mainstream. What is truly inexplicable
is the lack of attention the Court pays to Article 23 of the German Basic Law and its
failure to see that transnational cooperation does not compromise sovereignty or
democracy. How is it possible to describe Germany’s ‘constitutional identity’ without
including Article 23?
So there is no alternative, in my view. The European Commission ought to launch
infringement proceedings before the Court of Justice for Germany’s failure to comply
with its duties under EU law. This process will hopefully concentrate minds in the
German legal world. It may be an opportunity for legal scholarship to discuss openly
the illegitimacy as well as the insularity of the Constitutional Court’s ideas. Scholars
may be able to persuade the Court that its novel doctrines are paradoxical and false
and that it should return to the openness of Lisbon and Honeywell. But no outside
action by the EU or the Court of Justice can solve this problem. This crisis lies deep
into the German Constitutional Court’s misguided doctrinal arguments.
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